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In the last few months the EU has undergone profound changes: the third stage 
of Economic and Monetary (EMU) began on January 1 1999, while in 1998 
accession negotiations started with five Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) and Cyprus.'To date, both in academic analysis and in policy-making, 
the processes of deepening and widening of the EU have generally been treated 
separately. The aim here is to examine the links between these two integration 
processes, and, in particular, to assess the likely impact of the euro on 
enlargement.
The introduction of the euro will have important implications for third 
countries, and, in particular, for countries like the CEECs which have tight 
economic and financial links with the EU. In preparing to join the EU, and 
(eventually) EMU, these countries will have to make fundamental choices with 
regard to the appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rates to adopt. The 
CEECs will also have to introduce far-reaching legal and institutional changes 
in order to meet the requirements for EU membership and participation in EMU.
The Working Group on Eastern Enlargement of the European Union met 
in Brussels in October 1998 to discuss these questions and to indicate, where 
possible, appropriate routes and strategies both for the applicant countries, and 
for the EU in perparing for EMU in an enlarged EU.
The following Section sets out the conditions the CEECs must meet for 
EU membership, concentrating on the requirements relating to EMU. Fulfilling 
the Maastricht criteria is not a condition for joining the EU, but the question of 
how far the applicant countries should adopt the criteria as an objective is also 
considered here. Section 3 sets out the legal and institutional obligations of the 
CEECs when they join the EU, even if they do not participate fully in Stage 3 of 
EMU. Section 4 discusses the economic implications of EMU for the CEECs, 
while Section 5 considers the question of appropriate choices with regard to 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. Section 6 deals with changes to be 
made in institutional arrangements in preparing to join EMU. Section 7 
indicates possible tensions between deepening and widening in the integration 
process, before drawing conclusions and indicating policy implications in the 
final section.
'Ten Central and East European countries (CEECs) applied for EU membership: Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. At the December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg the decision was taken to 




























































































2. The Preaccession Period: The Maastricht Criteria as a Medium-to-Long 
Term Objective
The 1993 Copenhagen Summit of the European Council set out the conditions 
which the application countries have to fulfill in order to join the EU. These 
conditions entail that the applicant countries have functioning market 
economies; are capable of dealing with competitive pressures and market forces 
in an enlarged Single European Union; that they can ensure stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, and that they must be able to take on the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims o f economic and 
monetary, and political union (emphasis in italics added).
At the Copenhagen Summit it was also stipulated that enlargement is 
subject to the condition that the EU is able to absorb new members and maintain 
the momentum of integration.
The requirement that the applicant countries are able to take on the 
"obligations o f membership" is generally taken to mean their ability to adopt the 
acquis communautaire,2 including the acquis relating to EMU. The applicant 
countries are also required to ensure effective implementation of the acquis ! 
and this will entail substantial changes in their administrative and judicial 
capacities.
The acquis communautaire is the body of EU legislation, practices, principles, and objectives 
accepted by the member states. It is composed of the Treaties (and, most importantly, the 
Treaties of Rome, the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and, following ratification, 
the Amsterdam Treaty); legislation enacted at the EU level and judgements of the European 
Court of Justice; Justice and Home Affairs; Foreign and Security Policy and Treaties of the 
EU with third countries. The acquis has been accumulating over the years and now amounts to 
some 12,000 legislative acts.
In Agenda 2000 (p.45) the Commission outlined a three-stage framework for the adoption of 
the acquis on the part of the applicant countries:
• implementation of the Europe Agreements (or Association Agreements) which the 10 
CEECs which have applied for EU membership have signed with the EU, in particular 
with regard to trade, national establishment, intellectual property and public procurement;
• progress in transposition and effective implementation of the measures set out in the 1995 
White Paper and, in particular, those relating to key aspects of the Single Market such as 
banking, public procurement and taxation, and
• ability to take on other aspects of the acquis. Areas singled out for attention include the 
environment, agriculture, energy, industry, telecommunications, transport, social affairs, 
customs administration and Justice and Home Affairs.
The Commission has also referred to the need to go "beyond the acquis" in certain areas such 




























































































The Madrid Summit of 1995 called for the "creation o f a stable economic 
and monetary environment" as one of the conditions for "gradual and 
harmonious integration o f the candidate countries into the EU."
From the decisions of the Copenhagen and Madrid Summits two 
important considerations emerge:
1) Preparing for EMU has to be analysed in the wider framework of getting 
ready for accession, which entails progress in meeting the Copenhagen criteria 
and taking on the acquis. In other words, progress in microconomic 
restructuring, privatisation and institutional change also have to be taken into 
account because of their implications for the macroeconomic performance of 
the applicant countries.
2) Specifically with regard to preparing for EMU, what is important is ensuring 
the overall stability of macroeconomic performance. This entails choosing 
appropriate macroeconomic policies, and developing the ability to correct 
macroeconomic distortions with policies compatible with market mechanisms.
It is important to stress that although the applicant countries have to adhere to 
the aim of EMU, and develop their capacity to correct macroeconomic 
distortions with market-based instruments, they are not obliged to meet the 
Maastricht criteria at the time of their accession.4 The Working Group agreed 
that the Maastricht criteria should not be regarded as a short-run objective, but 
rather a goal for the medium to long run. The present concern with meeting the 
convergence criteria in certain CEECs would seem premature, and may distract 
from the more important objective of preparing to join the EU. As Backe and 
Radzyner (1998, p. 17) argue: *i)
The Maastricht Treaty spelt out five criteria:
i) Successful candidates must have inflation rates no more than 1.5% above the average of the 
three countries with the lowest inflation rate in the Community.
ii) Long-term interest rates should be no more that 2% above the average of that of the three 
lowest inflation countries. This is to ensure that inflation convergence is lasting, because 
otherwise higher expected future inflation in a country would be reflected in higher long-term 
interest rates.
iii) The exchange rate of the country should remain within the "normal" band of the exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM) without tension and without initiating depreciation for two years. At 
the time of the Maastricht Treaty the "normal" band referred to the margins of +/-2.25%, but 
since August 1993, in some circles it is now taken to refer to +/-15%.
iv) The public debt of the country must be less than 60% of GDP.
v) The national budget deficit must be less than 3% of GDP.
The last two on the list (iv and v) are referred to as the "fiscal" criteria and are subject to an 
escape clause. A country may be granted a waiver if the gap between the actual and reference 





























































































"....a premature attempt at meeting the Maastricht criteria could easily lead to
inconsistencies in the policy mix and impair competitive positions, which could 
severely hamper the catching-up process upon which the advanced CEECs have 
embarked. Clearly, during the next few years catching up with Western Europe is a 
more immediate goal than meeting the Maastricht crieria, primarily because it 
facilitates EU accession and because it is a precondition for laying a sound basis for 
the ultimate accomplishment o f a high degree o f sustainable nominal convergence. "
However, although fulfilment of the convergence criteria is not a precondition 
for EU membership, as Agenda 2000 points out,5 they should "remain key points 
of reference for stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and must in time be 
fulfilled by the member states on a permanent basis
A further difficulty arising for the Maastricht criteria in the CEEC context is 
that their application in transition economies is not always appropriate. For 
example, the benchmark used for the interest rate criterion is usually the interest 
on 10-year government bonds, or comparable securies, and the fledgling nature 
of capital markets in the CEECs means that generally such bonds are not issued 
by the applicant countries. The problem of applicability also arises with regard 
to the exchange rate criterion as so far the CEECs have not participated in any 
EU exchange rate mechanism, and participation in such an arrangement for at 
least two years is a condition for adopting the euro. The concept of public 
deficit in the Maastricht Treaty refers to central, regional and local government 
as well as social security funds, and, as Daviddi and Ilzkovitz (1996) point out, 
the budget situation of local and regional governments is often difficult to 
assess in the CEECs. Moreover, in defining public deficits in the CEECs 
differences arise, for example, in the treatment of funds from privatisation and 
in payments to bail out banks and other financial institutions. One result of the 
application of the convergence criteria in the EU has been a process of 
standardizing definitions, though this is far from complete.
Tables 1-3 in the Appendix set out data for the CEECs with regard to the 
Maastricht criteria and other macroeconomic indicators, though it is important 
to recall that in some cases statistical harmonisation with Eurostat data is 
incomplete. Data on exchange rates has not been included here, given the 
problem of applicability of this criterion to the transition economies, but Table 
4 indicates the various exchange rate arrangements used by the CEECs.
As can be seen from Table 1, inflation is particularly resilient in the 
CEECs. Economic transformation may contribute to inflationary pressures in a 
number of ways: through price liberalisation and the ending of the CMEA 
trading system (with the consequent increase in energy prices), devaluation and




























































































increased public spending on infrastructure and unemployment benefits, wage 
indexation, and, in some countries, servicing of the public debt. As a result 
there may be increased inflationary expectations and these could prove self- 
fulfilling.
When the formerly closed and inefficient centrally planned economies 
were opened up to market forces a process of catching up with rapid gains in 
productivity occured. If the productivity gains are faster in the traded than in the 
non-traded sector, this could also generate inflation.
3. With Accession: Adopting the Acquis with Regard to EMU
The EU has decided that there will be no more opt-out clauses from EMU (such 
as those granted to the UK and Denmark) for new countries joining the EU. 
After accession, even as countries not participating fully in the third stage of 
EMU (i.e. with a temporary derogation), the countries joining the EU are 
therefore required to take on the acquis communautaire. As Joly Dixon (1998) 
describes, the main elements of the acquis in the area of EMU are:
• adherence to the objective of EMU;
• respect of the Stability and Growth Pact including regular submission of
9
convergence programmes in the context of EU surveillance (Art 99 § 2-5) ;
• the prohibition of direct public sector financing by the Central Bank and the 
ending of privileged access to that bank (Art .101); *8
This phenomenon is called the Balassa-Samuelson effect. When a small economy opens to 
international trade its export prices are set at the world level. If the country is on its production 
possibility frontier, increased productivity in traded goods leads to increased wages in the 
traded-goods sector. However, if wages are equalised between the traded and non-traded 
goods sectors, and the non-traded goods sector has lower productivity, inflation will increase. 
Grafe and Wyplosz (1997) stand this argument on its head, arguing that in transition 
economies the real appreciation determines real wages and hence the pace at which workers 
will leave the state sector, and join the new traded and non-traded sectors.
Until they meet the Maastricht criteria new EU members would not be able to join the euro
area.8
The Stability and Growth Pact was agreed at the Dublin Council of 1996 and confirmed at 
Amsterdam in 1997. According to the Pact, budget deficits would be limited to 3% of GDP, 
except if the country experienced a fall in GDP of over 2%. If a country exceeds the ceiling of 
3%, it would have to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP plus 0.1% for each 
point of the excess deficit., up to a maximum deficit of 6% of GDP. The deposit would be 
returned when the deficit falls below 3% of GDP, but if the excess deficit lasts for over two 
^ears the deposit could become a fine.




























































































• treatment of the exchange rate and of other economic policies as a matter of 
"common concern" (Art 99 and Art. 124) to be coordinated within the 
Council (Art. 99 §1);
• the orderly liberalisation of capital movements not only vis-à-vis other EU 
members, but also third countries (Art 56), and
• independence of the central bank (Art. 108) and its adherence to price 
stability as the primary objective (Art 105).
According to the Amsterdam Treaty (Art. I l l ) ,  when the CEECs join the EU 
they will have to participate in some form of exchange rate arrangement with 
euro area countries, and most EU Member States argue that exchange rate 
stability alone is insufficient to qualify for joining the euro zone (Backé and 
Radzyner, 1998).
The 1997 Amsterdam European Council set out the main features of ERM 2 
(exchange rate mechanism) which will govern exchange rate relations between 
the EU (11) and Member States not participating fully in Stage 3 of EMU from 
1999:* 10 *
• participation in ERM 2 will be voluntary, though "expected";
• ERM 2 will be based on fixed, but adjustable parity rates of participating 
currencies with regard to the euro. The standard fluctuation band will be +/- 
15% against the euro, though narrower bands may be agreed;
• intervention at the margin will be automatic and unlimited, and short-term 
financing will be available. The ECB and Central Banks of participating 
countries can suspend intervention if it conflicts with the primary objective 
of price stability;
• coordinated intramarginal intervention will be possible, and the flexible use 
of interest rates by non-euro countries will play an important role.
Even if the CEECs do not participate fully in Stage 3 of EMU when they join 
the EU their central banks will take part in the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB), but they will be allowed to conduct their own monetary policy 
and will keep their own official foreign exchange reserves. The Governors of 
the Central Banks of the CEECs will be members of the General Council of the 
ECB, and so will be able to follow monetary developments in the euro area 
closely. The General Council will also be responsible for monetary cooperation 
between the euro area and countries in the ERM 2.
ERM 2 was conceived essentially for EU currencies, but the possibility of extending it to the
CEECs prior to accession has been proposed, see Section 5 below.
However, the narrower bands have to be approved of by a procedure involving the European 
Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee, the ECB, the Ministers of Finance of 




























































































On joining the EU, even with derogations from Stage 3, CEEC Ministers 
will take part in the decision-making of Ecofin (the Council of Economic and 
Finance Ministers) on exchange rate policies and other monetary matters falling 
under the competence of the Council. Econfin is reponsible for defining the 
exchange rate regime and the negotiation of international monetary agreements 
after consultation with the ECB and the European Parliament. The Council, 
acting either on a qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission 
and after consulting the ECB, or on a recommendation from the ECB, may also 
formulate the orientation of exchange rate policy towards third countries,
though it must ensure that the primary objective of price stability is not 
12
prejudiced. CEEC representatives will also participate in Economic and 
Financial Committee which carries out regular reviews of the economic and 
financial situation of the EU and its member states, helps to prepare Ecofin 
decisions on monetary matters, and carries out a regular examination of the 
situation of capital movements and payments.
4. The Economic Effects of EMU on the CEECs
The Working Group generally agreed that the introduction of the euro would
13 14
have a positive impact on growth and trade in the euro area. The introduction 
of the euro would entail completion of the Single Market, increased price 
transparency and competition, and would remove exchange rate uncertainty and 
foreign exchange transaction costs between euro area countries. The allocation 
of resources is also likely to improve, with firms being able to locate where 
their unit costs are lowest and where they can best exploit economies of scale.
The positive effect on growth in the euro area is likely to be reflected in 
increased demand for imports from third countries, in particular, from countries 
like the CEECs, which have tight economic and trade links with the EU. 
Although increased trade and investment within the euro area could lead to 1234*
12
Article 111 of the Amsterdam Treaty .
13
Backe end Radzyner (1998) report that the Austrian Institute of Economic Research 
estimated that (if well managed) implementation of Stage Three of EMU would allow the 
participating countries to move to a growth path 1.75% higher than a hypothetical scenario in 
which the euro was not introduced. However, introduction of the euro is occurring at a time 
when real contagion from the East Asian crisis is causing growth forecasts in the EU to be 
revised downwards.
14
See, for instance, De Grauwe(1988) for empirical evidence of how exchange rate stability 
under the EMS contributed to intra-EC trade in the 1980s.
In theory forward exchange markets should provide hedging services against foreign 
exchange risks, but in practice such hedging involves a cost, and forward markets rarely cover 




























































































some trade and investment diversion from third countries, on balance the net 
impact on trade and growth in the applicant countries is likely to be positive, as 
a recent IMF study confirms. According to the IMF study, for each 1% growth 
in the GDP of the euro area, the CEECs could expect to benefit from a 0.6% 
increase in GDP and a 1.5% increase in exports.
The EU (ll) has a population of about 290 million, and in 1997 had a 
combined GDP of $6.5 trillion, compared with $8.7 trillion of the US. The euro
area accounted for 19% of world trade in 1997, which again is roughly
18
comparable to the US share of 17%. However, the role of the dollar in 
international trade and finance is far greater than its share of world trade and 
output might suggest. According to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), the dollar features on at least one side of 83% of all foreign exchange
19
transactions, the D-mark in 30% and other E U (ll) countries in 24%. As will 
be shown below, the dollar remains the single most important currency in the 
invoicing of trade, in the reserves of central banks, and in the denomination of 
international private assets.
Given the economic weight of the EU, and the likely impact of the euro in
further deepening and widening EU financial markets, it seems probable that
20
the euro will play a growing international role. Portes and Rey (1998) describe 
a circular mechanism by which this may come about. As euro markets for 
money and securities become more integrated and liquid, transaction costs will 
fall, rendering euro-denominated assets more attractive. This in turn will make 
it more likely that the euro becomes a vehicle currency. Increased holdings of
euro-denominated assets and use of the euro as a vehicle currency make the EU
21
financial market deeper, broader and more liquid, and so on. 16*8920
16
East/Central Europe: Benefits to be Reaped from Monetary Union. Study directed by Roger 
Nord as indicated in the press release of the IMF, Washington DC, October 1998 
CEEC (13) including the 10 applicant countries, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. The 
conclusions are based on the assumption of continued transition in the CEECs, and that the 
EU manages to avoid "reform fatigue” i.e. failure to introduce structural reform, lax fiscal
discipline and higher unemployment.
18
These statistics are taken from The Economist of 14/11/98.
19
As reported in The Economist of 14/11/98.
20
Some authors (Bergsten, 1997a, and McCauley and White, 1997) warn that an integrated 
market might take some time to emerge, given the present decentralisation of EU financial 
markets, and the absence of a central government borrower like the US Treasury which could
act as a fulcrum for the market.
21



























































































However, the extent to which the euro can challenge the dollar as an 
international currency will depend on how far the money and securities markets 
of the EU(11) become effectively integrated, and on confidence in the euro as a 
stable currency. A stable currency implies a low inflation/low depreciation risk 
and this in turn will depend on the anti-inflationary credibility of the ECB, and 
the extent to which stable macroeconomic policies are implemented under the 
Growth and Stability Pact. As Portes and Rey (1998) argue, the ability to reduce 
transaction costs in EU financial markets will also depend on the number of full 
participants in Stage 3 of EMU, and, in particular, on when and whether the UK 
joins, given the importance of the City as a financial centre.
In 1998 it was estimated that roughly half of total world export invoicing 
in the world was in dollars, while one third was in the major EU currencies 
(IMF, 1998). It seems probable that the euro will be used more than the
currencies which it replaces, since not only is trade in the euro area trade likely
22
to be invoiced in euro, but economies of scale will also encourage firms in 
countries which trade mainly with the EU (ll) to start invoicing in euro. Given 
the rapid redirection of CEEC trade towards to EU in recent years (see Table 5), 
it seems likely that many CEEC firms will invoice in euro both in trade with the 
EU (ll) and with other CEECs. In some CEECs multinational enterprises play 
an important role, and these may increasingly adopt the euro for cross-border 
transactions, and accounting. None the less widespread use of the dollar in 
invoicing is likely to continue, in particular in oil and commodity markets.
In 1997 57% of all official foreign exchange reserves were held in 
dollars, with a further 20% being held in EU currencies and the ECU, and about 
4.9% in yen (IMF, 1998). Next to the dollar, the D-mark was the most widely- 
held currency in official reserves (12.8%), and it seems likely that the euro will 
take over this task from the D-mark and other major EU (11) national 
currencies.
Bergsten (1997b, p.90) has estimated that official reserve shifts into euro 
could range between $100 billion and $300 billion, but argues that the time 
horizon over which such shift might occur is extremely uncertain. Inertia is an 
important force, and, for example, the pound sterling continued to play an 
important role as a reserve currency long after Britain’s decline as a hegemonic
23
power.
However, intra-EU(ll) trade will be considered "domestic" and so will not appear in 
calculations of the share of world trade invoiced in euros.




























































































Two reasons can be advanced to explain why the share of official reserve 
holdings in euro might increase at the expense of the dollar. First, there may be 
economies of scale in holding international reserves so that the ECB will need 
to hold fewer foreign currency reserves than did the Central Banks of the 
EU(11) prior to introduction of the euro. Secondly, it seems likely central banks 
in third countries, including the CEECs, will decide to increase the share of 
euros in their official reserves.
Countries pegging their exchange rate to the euro such as Poland or 
Hungary have a strong incentive to hold euros for intervention in foreign 
exchange markets. The holding of reserves will also reflect the importance of 
the euro in balance of payments transactions. The management of official 
reserves, and, in particular, the shares of different foreign currency held, will 
also be influenced by expectations about exchange rates and interest rates, and 
there may be some diversification of reserve portfolios in order to spread risks.
Future developments in the euro exchange rate and interest rates will also 
have implications for the debt servicing burdens of the CEECs, and to limit 
possible negative consequences, these countries might be advised to gear the 
composition of their debt to the basket or currency to which their currency is 
pegged or oriented.
Official reserves of currencies are relatively small compared with private 
holdings of international financial assets. Excluding intra-EU portfolios, in 
1996 global holdings of international financial assets, including bank deposits
24
and bonds, amounted to some $3.5 trillion. Roughly 50% of these were in 
dollars, and only 10% in EU(ll) currencies, so that, according to Bergsten 
(1997b, p.90), a balancing of portfolios would require a shift of $700 billion.
From 1999 governments of the EU(11) will issue debt in euros, and will 
begin to re-denominate existing securities in euros so that by 2002 all debt and 
other securities will be denominated in euros. However, despite the wide range 
of instruments issued by countries and companies, it seems likely that 
introduction of the euro will render the yield on portfolio investment in the 
E U (ll) more uniform. Insofar as the CEECs are able to provide an alternative 
which combines higher yields with moderate risk, they may be able to attract 
increased portfolio investment. Clearly, much will depend on what happens to 
interest rates in the euro area, since ceteris paribus lower E U (ll) interest rates 
increase the relative attractiveness of portfolio investments in the CEECs. The 
ability of the CEECs to develop broad and deep financial markets is also 
important in this context.




























































































One of the concerns expressed by the Working Group was that shifts in 
official reserves and private portfolios into euro could increase the value of the 
euro against the dollar. An appreciation of the euro against the dollar could lead 
to a current account deterioration in CEECs having a euro-oriented exchange
25
rate policy, though this effect would be mitigated by the large share of trade 
with the euro area.
A related issue was with the possibility of short-term volatility of the the
euro against other currencies such as the dollar and the yen. External trade of
26
the E U (ll) accounted for only about 10% of GDP in 1997, and the ECB is 
committed by the EU Treaty to price stability as its main priority. As a result 
there might be a risk of an inward-looking EU characterised by "benign neglect" 
with regard to movements of the euro against third currencies. On this point the 
Working Group was relatively optimistic about the possibilities for international 
cooperation, and argued that the introduction of the euro might render the EU 
more aware of its international responsibilities.
5. The Implications for Policy in the CEECs
In preparing for EMU, policy-makers in the CEECs have to make choices in 
three main (though interconnected) areas: fiscal policy, monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy, including the qustion of whether to introduce capital 
controls.
Fiscal Policy
As can be seen from Table 2, in general the ratio of public debt to GDP in the 
CEECs is relatively low. The large public debt in countries such as Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and (to a lesser extent) Poland is chiefly the result of foreign debt 
inherited from the previous regime, rather than reflecting present fiscal 
imbalances.
In 1997, as Table 2 shows, only Hungary (partly because of the heavy 
burden of serving the foreign debt), Slovakia and Romania failed to meet the 
Maastricht criterion with regard to fiscal deficit. However, the Working Group *26
Movement of the euro against other third currencies is likely to have less effect on the 
current account of a country such as Hungary, where the composition of the currency basket to 
which the forint is linked roughly corresponds to to the invoicing shares of foreign trade 
(Backe and Radzyner, 1998). However, this result will change when Hungary moves to a 
euro-only based peg from 2000, and is based on the assumption that there will not be






























































































considered that sustainability of fiscal consolidation in the transition countries 
was likely to encounter a number of difficulties, both on the spending and 
revenue sides.
Although external discipline can play a useful role in CEECs where fiscal 
deficits are too high, excessive concern for budgetary constraint may hinder
27
transition. The applicant countries face pressure for additional government 
spending from a number of sources. Improvements in infrastructure are urgently 
required in all these countries, and in many cases bad debts remain a problem. 
The task of taking on the acquis also calls for budgetary expenditure, in 
particular, in areas such as the environment, the modernisation of administration 
and improvement in judicial capacity. The CEECs are also engaged in 
fundamental reform of their pension systems, health care, and education.
Transition entails reform of the fiscal system by introducing taxes on 
income and value added in place of turnover taxes, and by widening the tax
base. Improvement in tax collection is urgently required in all these countries,
28
in particular as the growth of a new, green field private sector was 
accompanied by widescale tax evasion.
Monetary Policy
One of the conditions for joining the EU is that applicant countries are able to 
implement monetary policy with market-based instruments. Although complete 
harmonisation of monetary instruments with those of the euro zone is not 
required before full participation in Stage 3 of EMU, it is important that the 
accession countries begin preparing now, so that they are able to implement the
29
decisions of the ECB when they eventually adopt the euro.
The financial sectors of the applicant countries are already undergoing a 
process of fundamental change as the CEECs bring their regulation in line with 
EU standards as part of the process of adopting the acquis. It seems likely that 
the introduction of the euro will have a positive spillover effects in encouraging 
further financial restructuring in the CEECs. Insofar as introduction of the euro 
renders financial markets in the euro area broader, more liquid and more tightly 
integrated, competitive pressure to stimulate reform of the financial sectors in 
the CEECs could increase. 289
See also Tanzi (1993) for a discussion of these issues.
28
Also referred to as "organic" privatisation.
29
As Temprano-Anroyo and Feldman (1998) describe, even after the irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates, the practical arrangements for changeover to a single currency can take up to 




























































































The Working Group agreed on the need to develop sound, competitive, 
well-regulated and adequately supervised financial sectors in the CEECs, a 
lesson whose importance the East Asian crisis again underlined. The markets 
for money and securities must be developed to enable the effective operation of 
monetary policy instruments. It is necessary to resolve the problem of bad debts; 
improve the functioning of capital adequacy rates; complete the process of bank 
privatisation; develop well-functioning systems of payments, and ensure 
adequate competition in the financial sector. It was agreed that foreign 
ownership of banks may play a positive role where the new owners have a 
tradition of effective supervision, as, for instance, occurred in Hungary.
Exchange rate policy
As can be seen from Table 4, the CEECs opted for a wide range of exchange 
rate regimes, reflecting diverging views among economists and policy-makers 
with regard to which was the most "appropriate" exchange rate regime to adopt, 
but also the differing macroeconomic conditions at the start of transition 
(Gaspar, 1995). The choice of exchange rate regime in the CEECs may change 
over time, and is likely to be influenced by factors such as the historical 
legacy, progress in transition, the degree of development of financial markets, 
considerations of credibility, and the size and openness of the economy. The 
availability of reserves is also an important factor, and was a major reason 
behind the initial decision of Bulgaria and Romania to float.
Table 4 also indicates the changes in the CEEC exchange rate regimes 
which are likely to result from introduction of the euro. Countries which peg 
their exchange rate to a currency, or basket of currencies to be partially or 
totally replaced by the euro will have to alter their regime, and this could offer 
an opportunity for strategic choices, for example, by reducing the share of the 
US dollar in the basket.
With regard to exchange rate policy, there was general agreement in the 
Working Group that there should not be a single path in preparing for euro 
membership. What is important is that the choice of exchange rate regime is 
consistent with the overall macroeconomic policy mix. The CEECs should 
decide on an appropriate economic policy framework, and then ensure that the 
choice of exchange rate regime is consistent with that framework. However, in 
discussing possible alternatives, considerable differences of opinion arose. Four *31
For instance, when the country has opted for a currency board, or managed floating, this will 
influence subsequent choices.
31
Other countries will also have to adjust, such as the 14 francophone African countries which 




























































































possible paths were discussed: currency boards, managed floating, a unilateral 
peg, or introduction of some form of ERM 2 prior to accession.
Currency Boards have operated in Estonia since 1992, Lithuania since 
1994 and Bulgaria since 1997. Lithuania began an exit programme at the 
beginning of 1997, but this is presently on hold for an undetermined amount of 
time, partly because of the unstable situation in Russia. A currency board entails 
that the outstanding liabilities of the central bank are backed at least 100% by 
its foreign currency reserves. In the strictest form of currency board, any change 
in currency reserves translates immediately into a change in monetary base. In 
practice less strict versions of monetary boards are usually adopted, which
32
allow some discretion over the monetary base. The currency board also entails 
freedom of capital flows, and prohibits lending by the central bank to the public 
sector. The introduction of a monetary board therefore means sacrifice of 
monetary autonomy.
Currency boards may act as a means of gaining confidence in a new 
currency and may perform a useful role in extreme situations when inflation is 
high. However, the Working Group argued that they were a less attractive 
option when inflation was low, and applicant countries were trying to introduce 
fiscal and monetary instruments appropriate to a market-oriented economy. It 
was considered doubtful that a country would be allowed to pass directly from a 
currency board to full participation in Stage 3 of EMU. What seems more
For instance, this was the case in Estonia where the central bank has maintained some 
discretion concerning how far capital inflows are allowed to boost the monetary base, as well 
as maintaining minimum reserve requirements for commercial banks In general the Bank of 
Estonia has kept reserve coverage at about 110% (Korhonen, 1998).
On this point Backe and Pautola (1998) argue:
"In general there is no obvious reason why a central bank which runs a currency board should 
not be in a position to fulfill all the requirements the Treaty on European Union lays down in 
the area of central bank independence. As regards to price stability as a primary objective of 
central bank policy, a currency board has no policy tools at its disposal to directly fight 
inflation. However, empirical evidence has shown that a currency board tends to deliver low 
inflation or even price stability. Monetary policy cooperation among the EU countries is based 
on the existence of market-based monetary policy instruments, and on their effective use, if 
the need arises. Under a pure currency board regime, there is no (active) monetary policy. 
Furthermore, a currency board country cannot fully participate in an institutionalised exchange 
rate cooperation of a standard EU type, which requires flexible use of interest rates. Since a 
currency board does not allow for any direct control of price level and interest rate 
developments, meeting the monetary convergence criteria can also become more complicated. 
So far, Lithuania is the only East European currency board country that has officially 
announced an exit programme. Technically, exit would mean moving away from the strict 
concept of a currency board and loosening the backing rule, thereby building up more room to 




























































































likely is a gradual relaxing of the currency board with the introduction of
. 34monetary policy instruments in the applicant countries.
One of the main arguments advanced against floating rates was the cost 
of volatility, in particular, in small, open economies (though it was also pointed 
out that, as the East Asian crisis demonstrates, the cost of a foreign exchange 
crisis coupled with a debt crisis may be even higher). In discussing the option of 
managed floating, attention was drawn to what was described as the "rather 
successful" experience of Slovenia. The Slovenian tolar has displayed relatively 
little nominal volatility against the D-mark, partly as a result of regular 
intervention by the Central Bank, but also because of the relatively restrictive 
stance adopted with regard to capital movements (see below).
As set out at the Amsterdam European Council, ERM 2 was conceived 
for EU currencies. Although an exchange rate arrangement with non-EU 
counties is not at present envisaged by the EU and is not required by the Europe 
Agreements, it is "likely to remain high on the policy agenda in the coming 
years" Berrigan and Carré (1997, p. 123).
According to the Maastricht criteria, a country has to participate in the ERM 
within the normal bands for at least two years before admission to the euro area. 
If the accession countries cannot participate in the ERM 2 before they join the 
EU, they would have to wait for two years after accession until they meet this 
criterion formally. In the past the Council has demonstrated a certain flexibility 
in interpreting this criterion, and, for example both Finland and Italy were 
accepted, even though they had been in the ERM less than two years. However, 
some members of the Working Group were in favour of admission of the 
applicant countries to ERM 2 before EU accession, and advanced various 
arguments for this option:
• membership of ERM 2 would lend credibility to the CEECs, and increase the 
likelihood of nominal and real convergence with the euro area; *34
that of credibility. A lot will depend on how well the monetary authorities deal with their new 
monetary freedom."
34
For instance, in 1997 Lithuania announced that its currency board would be abandoned, and 
that a peg to the euro, or a basket including the euro would be introduced.
Slovenia completed liberalisation of current account transactions in 1995, and though there 
was some liberalisation of capital account transactions, capital controls were reintroduced in 
1995 and 1997.
Most CEECs liberalised current account transactions and capital flows associated with FDI 
(foreign direct investment) fairly early. The Baltic States opted for a relatively high degree of 
openness with regard to capital flows, while the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have 





























































































• with its wide bands, and calls for timely realignments, ERM 2 would prove 
flexible and this might help to avoid real misalignment, and disruptive 
movements in nominal exchange rates;
• ERM 2 would thereby obtain some meaning and critical mass, since 
otherwise ERM would be a rather "lonely" arrangement. At the time of its 
conception, it was widely believed that the ERM 2 would include more 
(possibly five or six) countries;
• an early inclusion of the CEECs in ERM 2 would furnish additional 
experience of cooperation in an EU context, helping them to see exchange 
rates and economic policies as a matter of common concern, and assisting 
the preparation for eventual full inclusion in EMU.
Against this, other members of the Working Group expressed doubts about the 
effectiveness of ERM 2 in the event of a speculative attack, in particular, if the 
bands of fluctuation remained as wide as +/- 15%. Even wide bands are likely to 
prove ineffective in the face of prolonged capital movements. For example, if 
capital inflows continue, the exchange rate simply simply moves to the upper 
end of the band, limiting competitiveness, but not arresting the capital flows.
ERM 2 envisages marginal and intramarginal intervention, using a 
modified form of the Very Short Financing Facility. It is, however, subject to 
the condition that the ECB’s primary objective of price stability is not 
jeopardised, which implies a certain asymmetry with regard to obligations. The 
commitment of the ECB to intervene on behalf of a non-euro currencies is 
therefore limited, and some members of the Working Group argued that it was 
probable that the ECB would prove reluctant to take on obligations with regard 
to the pre-ins.
Some members of the Working Group argued in favour of pegged 
exchange rates on ground of credibility and the usefulness of the exchange rate 
as an anchor in countries with a history of fiscal and monetary mismanagement. 
Some were in favour of a crawling peg, though others argued that these may be 
subject to destabilising expectations.
The main criticisms made by members of the Working Group who 
opposed arrangements such as a unilateral peg, or joining some form of ERM 2 
prior to accession was that they would not allow enough flexibility to meet the 
problems arising from real appreciation of the exchange rate, capital inflows, 
and possible asymmetric shocks in the accession countries. Moreover, if the 




























































































convergence, relative prices will not have adjusted fully, which renders the level 
of equilibrium exchange rate difficult to assess.
37
Various studies confirm that transition economies have generally 
followed a pattern of significant initial undervaluation of the exchange rate 
followed by real appreciation. This real appreciation can be explained by the 
productivity gains associated with the catching-up process and the inflationary 
pressures intrinsic to transition. As Halpem and Wyplosz (1997) argue, real 
appreciation is the "equilibrium outcome o f successful transition." If a country 
pegs its exchange rate and its productivity growth is higher than that of the euro 
area, then its inflation will be higher than in the euro area as real appreciation 
cannot take place through changes in the nominal rate. As a result, the country 
may have difficulty in meeting the Maastricht criterion on inflation. Inflation 
can be brought down to low levels only if the nominal exchange rate is allowed 
to appreciate.
Most of the CEECs furthest advanced in economic transition (such as the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) have, on occasion, experienced
39
difficulties as a result of large-scale capital inflows. These were encouraged 
by the relatively high interest rates implied by the macroeconomic stabilisation *389
According to Berrigan and Carré (1997), without adequate understanding of equilibrium 
conditions, agreeing on a central parity for the CEECs against the euro would be a "hit and 
miss" affair. They therefore advocate a cautious approach to adopting a hard peg.
See for instance Halpem and Wyplosz (1997) or Nuti (1996).
38
The Czech case proves a good example of the difficulty of attempting to peg the nominal 
exchange rate in a transition economy. A currency basket peg was first introduced in 1991. 
The composition of the basket was changed in 1992, and again in 1993 when the koruna's 
exchange rate was based on a basket made up of the dollar (35%) and D-mark (65%). Full 
convertibility of the koruna was implemented from October 1, 1995. The fluctuation band of 
+/- 0.5% was increased to +/- 7.5% in February 1996. Initially (as was also the case in Poland) 
the magnitude of the devaluation prevented the exchange rate from acting as an effective 
anchor. Subsequently, nominal currency stability and a higher rate of inflation than in OECD 
countries undermined the cushion which an undervalued exchange rate provided in the early 
years of transition. The real appreciation of the exchange rate was not matched by increases in 
productivity, and Czech firms began to lose competitiveness. Strong speculative pressure 
emerged and the Czech Central Bank attempted to fight the speculative attacks using foreign 
exchange intervention and an increase of interest rates. It is estimated that some $2 billion in 
reserves was spent in an attempt to maintain the fixed exchange rate system, (Financial 
Times, 1/12/1997). However, in May 1997 it was forced to switch to a managed float based on 
a target rate of 17-19.5 koruna per D-Mark.
39
As Gabrisch (1997, p.577-580) explains, the difficulties experienced by certain CEECs as a 
result of capital inflows could be repeated after enlargement as a consequence of transfers to 




























































































programmes in transition economies, at a time when interest rates in Western 
Europe and the US were relatively low.
Capital inflows may create difficulties for the recipient country in a
40
number of ways. Sudden surges in capital inflows may lead to rapid monetary 
expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation, and widening 
current account deficits. The inflow of foreign capital may also lead to 
speculative bubbles, with sharp increases in prices of property, and on the stock 
exchange. A major fear is that, given the volatility of international capital 
movements, substantial capital inflows may be followed capital flight.
As sterilisation may be difficult to implement and costly in transition 
economies, some members of the Working Group were in favour of controls on
41
capital movements. They pointed to the East Asian experience which provided 
further evidence for the risks of overhasty liberalisation of capital movements 
when it is combined with lax enforcement of prudential rules, weak regulation 
and poor supervision of the financial sector.
Although freedom of intra-EC capital flows was required as part of the 
Single Market acquis (Directive 88/361/EEC), transitional periods were granted 
to Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Several members of the group suggested 
that when the CEECs join the EU, there might be a case for them maintaining 
some precautionary restrictions on capital movements temporarily and for 
allowing the possible reinstatement of transient controls in emergency 
situations, provided there is adequate prior consultation with the ECB.
Other members of the Working Group were opposed to capital controls 
arguing that a major difficulty is ensuring their effectiveness, as capital flows 
may be re-routed through other channels (such as current account transactions, 
and intra-firm transfers of transnational enterprises). Moreover, it was pointed 
out that capital controls may worsen the international allocation of resources, 
preventing countries from achieving a better international diversification of 
their portfolios, and reducing the necessary funds for investment in the country 
concerned. They may also insulate the country from competitive pressures, 
thereby reducing the incentives to introduce necessary reforms. Capital controls 
(and even more so, exchange controls) also entail administrative costs and may 
permit a certain degree of bureaucratic discretion. However, there seemed 
general agreement that where capital liberalisation occurred, it should take 401
40
As Calvo et al (1996) explain for the case of developing countries.
41
A distinction may be made between capital controls, which refer movements on capital 
account, while exchange controls (such as the proposed "Tobin tax") extend also to current 




























































































place in a gradual and orderly way and should be paralleled by improvements in 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector.
The role of the exchange rate mechanism is to act as a shock absorber in
42
the event of asymmetric shocks. The question which arises is whether between 
the EU and CEECs the likelihood of asymmetric shocks will be greater or less 
in an enlarged EU. It seems likely that transition countries with an insufficient 
level of structural adjustment, and low economic and financial convergence 
with the EU will be more liable to asymmetric shocks with regard to the euro 
area. As integration proceeds, it will probably be accompanied by some 
convergence of consumer tastes and preferences. If this is the case, on the 
demand side the shocks would be more likely to affect all the partners, reducing 
the role for a shock-absorber such as adjustment of exchange rates.
The implications for the production side are less clear. If integration leads 
to specialisation according to a Ricardian concept of comparative advantage, 
the economies of an enlarged EU will become less similar and more vulnerable 
to asymmetric shocks. Against this, a growing share of trade between the EU 
states and the CEECs is intra-industry. This could be taken to imply that the 
economic structures of the potential members of an enlarged EU are becoming 
more similar and so are less likely to be affected by asymmetric shocks.
The cost of forgoing the exchange rate instrument will also be less if it 
can be replaced by alternative mechanisms. Such mechanisms could include
45
wage-price flexibility and factor mobility, and EU or national measures such *435
These are disturbances which affect the countnes involved in different ways.
43
For instance, according to Eurostat data (Eurostat Statistics in Focus, External Trade), in 
1995 the share of intra-industry trade in trade with the EU was 68% for Slovenia, 65% for the 
Czech Republic, 60% for Hungary, 48% for Poland and 34% for Estonia.
44
However, even here the issue is far from being clear-cut, since what appears as intra­
industry trade may in fact disguise huge differences in quality. The concept of intra-industry 
trade has been challenged as being merely a statistical phenomenon since, in general, the 
measured level of intra-industry trade decreases as the level of disaggregation of data 
increases. What is needed in this context is further research into the distinction between 
vertical intra-industry trade (involving quality differences) and horizontal intra-industry trade 
(which is trade in genuinely similar products).
45
Wage-price flexibility implies that in the case of a permanent adverse asymmetric shock the 
real wages and relative prices in that country or region (if the production is concentrated in a 
particular area) will fall. There will be a strong incentive for workers to move to other regions 
or countries where real wages are higher. Similarly, if there is sufficient capital mobility, 
capital will be attracted to other regions where the remuneration of investment is higher. If 
factors of production were sufficiently mobile, this process would continue until differences in 




























































































as regional or budgetary policy which could be used to compensate regions or 
countries which have been adversely affected.
Although in some cases the transition economies have displayed a 
relatively high degree of real wage and price flexibility, as Backe and Radzyner 
(1998) argue, this has not always been the case, and moreover may be a 
transitional feature associated with the transformation process.
The Single Market Programme has led to a high level of capital mobility 
in the EU, but this is much less the case for labour. Freedom of labour 
movement is also one of the most sensitive aspects of enlargement, given the 
widespread fear in existing EU member states that removal of the barriers could
46
lead to large-scale migration to the West. For this reason there has been much 
debate about whether to introduce a transition period before allowing full 
mobility of labour after Eastward enlargement, even though this runs counter to
4V
one of the fundamental tenets of the Internal Market Programme.
In the case of a single country if the demand for a good whose production 
is concentrated in a particular region falls, transfers from the government 
budget may be used to compensate producers in that region for the loss of 
income. However, the task of fiscal consolidation in the CEECs is likely to limit 
the funds available for this purpose. At least in theory EU regional or budgetary 
policies could be used in a similar way to offset the repercussions of asymmetric 
shocks between the member states. However, both the size of the EC Budget 
(with a ceiling of 1.27% of EU GDP) and the limit of 4% of GDP on transfers 
through the Structural Funds proposed by Agenda 2000 severely restrict the 
ability of the Community to carry out this role in an enlarged EU. A way round 
this difficulty would be to rely on stabilisation rather than compensation, and 
establish an EU stabilisation fund for this purpose, but at present such a 
measure is not on the agenda, and does not seem to have much political support 
(Polak, 1997, p. 509).
However, much of the recent literature suggests that migration in an enlarged EU will be on 
a manageable scale. This conclusion emerges either from a comparison with labour flows 
from South to North Europe over the 1950-1970 period (CEPR, 1992) or from an analysis of 
the factors underlying the decision to migrate (Faini, 1995, and Faini and Venturini, 1994). 
Individuals have a preference for living in their own country for social, cultural and linguistic 
reasons, so an individual will only undertake migration when the wage differential is large 
enough to offset the non-monetary costs of migration.
47




























































































6. Procedures for Dialogue, Cooperation and Coordination
As part of the pre-accession strategy, the CEECs participate in the activities of 
Ecofin, and of various working groups, and sub-committees on economic 
issues. They cooperate in technical areas such as the preparation of statistics 
and macroeconomic forecasting. The Accession Partnerships also entailed 
annual Joint Assessment of medium-term economic policy priorities. However, 
there is still scope for including the CEECs more effectively in EU mechanisms 
of coordination of economic policies.
When the applicant countries join the EU, even without participating 
fully in Stage 3 of EMU, they are obliged to treat their economic policies as a 
matter of common interest and coordinate them in the Council. This involves 
participation in the procedures to monitor economic performance in the EU and 
its member states, as well as the coordination of economic policies through 
national convergence programmes, broad guidelines and multilateral 
surveillance to assess the consistency of the policies of the EU and its member 
states with the broad policy guidelines (Art.99§2-5 of the Amsterdam Treaty). 
They would also participate in the excessive deficit procedure as reinforced by 
the Growth and Stability Pact. The President of the Council represents the 
member states in inter-institutional relations so helping to organise the 
coordination of economic and monetary policy. In this way the new Member 
States would be involved in the consultations between the Council and ECB, 
and they would participate in the Economic and Financial Committee.
The consultation procedures in the EU are already at an advanced stage 
and there would seem a strong case for including the applicant countries in 
these as early and as far as is possible in order to familiarise CEEC policy­
makers with the practical workings of EMU.
Some members of the Working Group agreed with the proposal of 
Bergsten (1997a) that EMU should lead to the replacement of the Group of 
7/Group of 10 countries by a Group of Three. However, the issues of 
responsibility for international economic policy and representation of the EU at 
the international level emerge from the Maastricht Treaty in a blurred manner. 
The ECB is responsible for monetary policy, while formal exchange rate 
agreements, and the orientation of exchange rate policy fall under the 
competence of the Council. Fiscal policy remains in the hands of the Member 
States, though subject to the constraints of the Growth and Stability Pact. It is 
therefore difficult to see how the ECB could represent the EU on issues relating 
to fiscal and exchange rate policies.
For further discussion of these issues see Daviddi and Ilzkovitz (1996) Temprano-Arroyo 




























































































The Vienna European Council of December 1998 endorsed a report of the 
Council on external representation of the Community which foresees that the 
President of the Ecofin Council (or if the President is from a non-euro area 
Member State, the President of the Euro-11 assisted by the Commission) shall 
participate in meetings of the G7. The ECB as the Community body responsible 
for monetary policy should be granted observer status at the IMF Board. The 
views of the EU on other issues relating to EMU would be presented at the IMF 
Board by an official from the Member State holding the Presidency assisted by 
a representative of the Commission.49
The issue of whether regional organisations such as the EU should play a 
more active role in international surveillance was raised in the context of a more 
general discussion concerning "new international financial architecture." Aside 
from the problem of representation, the introduction of EMU raises complex 
questions concerning future institutional relations between the IMF and EU. 
New techniques and procedures will have to be developed in order to enable the 
IMF to continue its surveillance of monetary and exchange rate policies in the 
EU, and it was felt that this IMF surveillance could provide a useful 
complement to internal EU procedures.
With regard to the CEECs, some members of the Working Group argued 
in favour of two-tier supervision, with national supervision being backed up by 
the reinforced role for the EU. The EU has a relatively well-developed system 
of financial supervision, and this experience could be used to the benefit of the 
CEECs. This could be achieved by giving greater priority to the question of 
supervision in the PHARE Programme. Against this, other members of the 
Working Group argued that this would encounter considerable principal-agent 
problems, and raised delicate questions of national sovereignty. There seemed 
widespread support for the idea that the IMF could play a more active role in 
ensuring that supervisory standards were better implemented in the CEECs.
7. The Impact of the Introduction of the Euro and Enlargement on the 
Integration Process
The question was raised of whether deepening of the integration process would 
imply an additional hurdle for widening. This might arise because EMU adds to 
the acquis which has to be taken on by the applicant countries, or because the 
time and energy devoted to EMU means less for enlargement.
Against this it was argued that an EU strengthened by EMU would be in a 
better position to take decisions on enlargement. Padoa Schioppa (1988) refers





























































































to the "contradictory quartet" which no international monetary arrangement has 
been able to reconcile simultaneously, namely:
• liberalised trade
• free capital movements
• fixed exchange rates
• autonomy of monetary policy
The way forward entailed by introduction of the euro is to combine the first 
three elements of Padoa Schioppa's list with a common monetary policy. 
Introduction of the euro would remove certain fundamental consistences in the 
present situation, so facilitating the enlargement process.
According to Eurobarometer surveys, public opinion in the CEECs 
remains very positive towards market reforms, and towards the European Union 
in general, although it has been falling in recent years (and, according to some 
members of the Working Group, expectations have becoming more realistic). It 
is perhaps telling that to date Eurobarometer has carried out no surveys of 
attitudes towards EMU in the CEECs.
Conclusions
Despite heated discussions on various issues such as the relative advantages of 
different exchange rate regimes for economies in transition, or the usefulness or 
effectiveness of capital controls, a number of conclusions emerged from the 
discussions of the Working Group:
50 During the first period of the EMS (1979-83) participating countries maintained controls on 
capital movements and there were frequent realignments of exchange rates. After 1983 Italy 
and France managed to acquire exchange rate stability but only through losing autonomy for 
monetary policy and recourse to capital controls. Britain realised free capital movements and 
trade during the 1980s but only at the cost of exchange rate stability.
The 1998-92 period of the EMS was characterised by great stability, if not rigidity of 
exchange rates. The only realignments which took place were considered "technical", as for 
instance when Italy entered the narrow +/-2.25 band of fluctuation in 1990. The introduction 
of the Single Market entailed a commitment to free trade and capital movements. This system 
could survive only as long as the other ERM countries were prepared to sacrifice monetary 
autonomy and accept German policy leadership. In 1992 other EMS members were reluctant 
to raise their interest rates to the high levels applied in Germany after re-unification. They 
decided to regain a certain degree of monetary autonomy but this was only achieved by 
sacrificing fixed exchange rates, first with the currency fluctuations of 1992/3 and then from 




























































































Preparing for EMU has to be analysed in the wider framework of getting 
ready for accession, which entails progress in meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria and taking on the acquis.
The Maastricht criteria should not be regarded as a short-run objective for 
the CEECs, but rather a goal for the medium-to-long run.
Introduction of the euro is likely to have a positive effect on trade and 
growth in the euro area, and this will probably be reflected in increased 
demand for imports from third countries, in particular, from countries like 
the CEECs, which have tight economic and trade links with the EU.
It seems probable that the CEECs will use the euro to a greater extent than 
the currencies it replaces in the invoicing of trade, in the reserves of their 
central banks, and in the denomination of international private assets
The sustainability of fiscal consolidation in the transition countries is likely 
to encounter a number of difficulties, in particular, because additional 
government spending is necessary on infrastructure, pension systems, health 
care, education, and for the task of taking on the acquis communautaire.
The CEECs urgently need to develop sound, competitive, well-regulated and 
adequately supervised financial sectors in order to implement monetary 
policy with market-oriented instruments, and as a means of avoiding the 
negative implications of volatile international capital movements.
With regard to exchange rate policy, there should not be a single path in 
preparing for euro membership. What is important is that the choice of 
exchange rate regime is consistent with the overall macroeconomic policy 
mix. The CEECs should decide on an appropriate economic policy 
framework, and then ensure that the choice of exchange rate regime is 
consistent with that framework.
Capital liberalisation should take place in a gradual and orderly way, and 
should be paralleled by improvements in regulation and supervision of the 
financial sector. When the CEECs join the EU, several members of the 
Working Group suggested that there might be a case for applicant countries 
maintaining some precautionary restrictions on capital movements 
temporarily and allowing the possible reinstatement of transient controls in 
emergency situations, provided there is adequate prior consultation with the 
ECB.
The consultation procedures in the EU are already at an advanced stage and 




























































































as early and as far as is possible in order to familiarise CEEC policy-makers 
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Table 1: Inflation and Long-term Interest Rates in the CEECs
Inflation 
(average annual 





Bulgaria 62.0 123.0 1084.7 330.1 209.9
Czech 9.1 8.8 8.4 12.5 13.2
Republic
Estonia 29.0 23.1 11.2 12.3 11.4
Hungary 28.2 23.6 18.3 28.2 23.1
Latvia 25.1 17.7 8.7 26.2 14.1
Lithuania 39.6 24.6 8.8 24.1 13.0
Poland 27.8 19.9 15.0 19.6 23.9
Romania 32.3 38.8 154.8 71.5 107.9
Slovakia 9.9 5.8 6.1 13.5 20.9
Slovenia 13.5 9.9 8.4 23.7 21.3
The Maastricht Criterion refers to 10-year government bonds (or the nearest 
maturities). As these are not available for most CEECs, the interest rates are 
generally for bank lending rates.
Source: Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1998)
Table 2: The Fiscal Criteria in the CEECs
General gov. 
debt as % 
GDP 1997
Government surplus/deficit 
as % GDP 
1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria 105.2 -6.4% -13.4 -2.6
Czech 10.9 -1.3 -1.8 -2.2
Republic
Estonia 5.6 -1.2 -1.5 2.1
Hungary 68.0 -6.8 -3.1 -4.8
Latvia 10.8 -3.4 -1.1 1.8
Lithuania 22.2 -1.8 -2.7 -0.5
Poland 48.2 -2.4 -2.5 -3.1
Romania 31.3 -2.6 -4.0 -3.6
Slovakia 26.7 -2.2 n.a -4.8
Slovenia 24.1 0.0 0.3 -1.1




























































































Table 3: Growth and Unemployment in the CEECs
Growth of GDP Unemployment
Real percentage change %, ILO definition
1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997
Bulgaria 2.1 -10.8 -6.9 14.7 13.7 15.0
Czech 6.4 3.9 1.0 4.1 3.5 4.7
Republic
Estonia 4.3 4.0 11.4 9.7 10.0 10.5
Hungary 1.5 1.3 4.4 9.5 9.2 8.1
Latvia -0.8 3.3 6.5 18.9 18.3 14.4
Lithuania 3.3 4.7 5.7 17.1 16.4 14.1
Poland 7.0 6.1 6.9 13.3 12.3 11.2
Romania 7.1 3.9 -6.6 8.0 6.7 6.0
Slovakia 6.9 6.6 6.5 13.2 11.1 11.6
Slovenia 3.9 3.1 3.8 7.4 7.3 7.1
Source: Dixon (1998)
Table 4: The Likely Impact of Introduction of the Euro on Exchange Rate 
Regimes in the CEECs
Currency Current Regime Likely future 
Arrangements
Bulgarian lev Peg to D-Mark Peg to euro
Croatian kuna Managed float, shadows DM Managed float, shadow euro
Czech koruna Managed float, shadows DM Managed float, shadow euro
Estonian kroon Currency board Switch to euro peg
Hungarian Crawling peg; basket 70% DM, Jan 1 1999 euro replaced DM
forint 30% US$ in peg basket; Jan 1 2000
Latvian lat Informal peg to SDR
switch to euro only peg 
Switch to euro peg not before
Lithuanian litas Currency board
2000
Switch to 50:50 $/euro fixed
Polish zloty Basket: 45% US $, 35% DM,
rate, probably in 1999 
Jan 1 1999, include euro in
20% others, crawling peg new basket; slower crawling
Romanian leu Managed float
peg. Eventually switch to euro- 
only basket 
Managed float
Slovakian Managed float, shadows DM Switch to euro shadow
koruna
Slovenian tolar Managed float Eventually fix rate to euro




























































































Table 5: The increase in the EU share of the total trade of selected CEECs 


























Hungary 24.8% (EC) 
6.4% (Austria) 
5.4% (GDR)




Poland 31.8% (EC) 
0.5 (EFTA)
64.0% 34.2% (EC) 
0.7% (EFTA)
63.8%
Bulgaria 5.5% (EC) 
1.5% (EFTA)
43.3% 10.3% (EC) 
3.9% (EFTA)
37.3%
Romania# 28.5% (EC) 
3.2% 
(EFTA)




# Earlier data is for 1988
Unless otherwise stated the statistics are for EC 12 in 1989 and EU 15 in 1997.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, own calculations on the basis of PlanEcon and EC 
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